Hi, I know that seL4 provides confidentiality, which is described as a property that "means that data cannot be read without permission." Given this wording, I wonder if it is not possible to revoke those permissions in certain cases. In particular, I would like for one camkes component to be able to perform runtime measurements, such as heap analysis, on another component. Or even better, I would like for a component to be able to perform runtime measurements on a program running within the camkes linux vm. Is such a feat possible? Best, Michael Neises
On 26 Oct 2019, at 08:00, Michael Neises
Hi,
I know that seL4 provides confidentiality, which is described as a property that "means that data cannot be read without permission." Given this wording, I wonder if it is not possible to revoke those permissions in certain cases. In particular, I would like for one camkes component to be able to perform runtime measurements, such as heap analysis, on another component. Or even better, I would like for a component to be able to perform runtime measurements on a program running within the camkes linux vm. Is such a feat possible?
Hi Michael seL4’s confidentiality (and other security) enforcement means that the kernel guarantees that you can only access objects to which you have been given explicit permission (in the form of a capability). How those permissions are allocated is a matter of policy, the kernel doesn’t care, it only enforces. In particular, it is totally possible in seL4 to give one component access to another component’s address space, that’s for the user-level policy framework to decide. Whether the present CAmkES framework supports this is a different question, which I’ll leave to someone who’s more up to date with CAmkES details. Gernot
If only considering native components, it would be possible to extend camkes to support the notion of creating a shared data connector between 2 components that is defined by the address space of one end. It could currently be done with a custom connector type that assumed a maximum virtual address of the target component I believe, but adding specific support into camkes would likely allow specifying the elf program segments as something a shared connector could be connected to.
But because camkes is a static system where you can specify that the monitor component has read only access to the other native component.
For native Linux processes in a vm, you would probably need to trust modules inside the vmm and the Linux kernel to describe where the process's address space ends up in memory in order to scan it.
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From: Devel
Hi,
I know that seL4 provides confidentiality, which is described as a property that "means that data cannot be read without permission." Given this wording, I wonder if it is not possible to revoke those permissions in certain cases. In particular, I would like for one camkes component to be able to perform runtime measurements, such as heap analysis, on another component. Or even better, I would like for a component to be able to perform runtime measurements on a program running within the camkes linux vm. Is such a feat possible?
Hi Michael seL4’s confidentiality (and other security) enforcement means that the kernel guarantees that you can only access objects to which you have been given explicit permission (in the form of a capability). How those permissions are allocated is a matter of policy, the kernel doesn’t care, it only enforces. In particular, it is totally possible in seL4 to give one component access to another component’s address space, that’s for the user-level policy framework to decide. Whether the present CAmkES framework supports this is a different question, which I’ll leave to someone who’s more up to date with CAmkES details. Gernot _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@sel4.systems https://sel4.systems/lists/listinfo/devel
participants (3)
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Heiser, Gernot (Data61, Kensington NSW) -
Mcleod, Kent (Data61, Kensington NSW) -
Michael Neises